Who is iraq allies with

Iraq benefits from functioning government institutions, including an active legislature, and plays an increasingly constructive role in the region. The United States maintains vigorous and broad engagement with Iraq on diplomatic, political, economic, and security issues in accordance with the U.

Covering a wide range of bilateral issues, including political relations and diplomacy, defense and security, trade and finance, energy, judicial and law enforcement issues, services, science, culture, education, and environment, it emphasizes the important relationship and common goals the two countries share. Since , the United States has contributed billions of dollars in humanitarian, demining, and stabilization aid to conflict-affected and displaced Iraqis in the region, including support for communities recovering from genocide.

The Iraqi government has stated its intention to transition from a centrally run economy to one that is market oriented. To increase trade, the United States has designated Iraq as a beneficiary developing country under the Generalized System of Preferences program and several U.

Iraq maintains an embassy in the United States at Massachusetts Ave. February The Iraq Reconstruction conference in Kuwait is attended by 70 countries and international organisations as well as 2, private sector companies, mobilising nearly USD million to support reconstruction. Get the latest updates. Relations with Iraq Last updated: 01 Jun. Iraq is one of a range of countries beyond the Euro-Atlantic area — often referred to as "partners across the globe" — with which NATO is developing relations.

In , NATO agreed to grant Iraq partner status and a jointly agreed Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme was signed in September , providing a framework for political dialogue and tailored cooperation.

At the request of the Iraqi government, NATO agreed in July on a package of defence capacity building measures to provide assistance in a number of priority areas where NATO could provide added value. They also agreed to provide a training and capacity-building effort within Iraq, at the request of the Iraqi government. In January , a small Core Team of NATO civilian and military personnel was established in Baghdad to coordinate training and capacity-building activities in support of Iraqi security forces and institutions.

Mobile security sector reform teams began to travel to Iraq to conduct training. At the Brussels Summit in July , Allied leaders launched a non-combat training and capacity-building mission in Iraq, in response to a request from the government of Iraq to scale up training and advising efforts. In February , in line with a request from the Iraqi government, Allied defence ministers decided to increase the size of NATO Mission Iraq and to expand training activities to include more Iraqi security institutions, and areas beyond Baghdad.

Nevertheless, Syria opposed the U. Damascus provided refuge for many Iraqi Baathist leaders and allowed jihadists to cross its border and join the insurgency.

Baghdad and Damascus nevertheless restored diplomatic relations in and began to build cooperation. They also explored cooperation on trade, roads, rail networks, and border security. But the relationship was late in blossoming and only began to improve significantly in and Syria, which had supported Iraqiyya in , abandoned its support for Allawi and joined Iran in backing Maliki in the formation of his government. By this time it was clear that all U. And by , Syria and its allies were focused on the Syrian uprising.

However, Maliki began to lean more toward the embattled Assad regime as fears of a hostile takeover in Damascus increased. Erbil, seeing the potential for Syrian Kurdish autonomy, was emboldened by the empowerment of its Kurdish brethren. The war against the Assad regime has prompted thousands of foreign jihadi fighters to make their way to Syria, and many of them have come through Iraq or now go back and forth across the porous Iraqi-Syrian border. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which had declined somewhat in recent years, rebranded itself al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Levant in and has become one of the strongest armed groups in northern Syria.

Fighting al-Qaeda has become a primary concern of the Maliki government and is now driving many of its discussions with other countries in the region and around the world. The Jordanian economy also benefited from exports to Iraq and provided banking and business services for firms hesitant to operate directly in the dangerous Iraqi environment.

Jordan already receives some oil from Iraq, and one-fourth of Jordanian industrial exports go to Iraq. But Amman worries about the security implications of radical jihadi groups in the turbulent Anbar Province and has had to handle the influx of over half a million Iraqi refugees into Jordan.

As Syria has descended into conflict, Iraqi-Jordanian relations have taken on more importance as the overland route through Syria is no longer available. And given the planned Basra—Aqaba double pipeline and the possibility of rerouting the Iran—Iraq—Syria gas pipeline through Jordan, 49 Baghdad and Jordan appear set to remain important economic partners.

The two countries do not share a border, so Egypt has been able to prioritize economic over immediate security interests. The outlines of this relationship are unlikely to change dramatically in the wake of the ouster of President Morsi by the military in July In , Egypt was the first Arab country to restore diplomatic relations with Baghdad.

But both sides sought to rebuild economic relations between Baghdad and Cairo, which had slowed considerably. After Morsi was removed from power, the military-backed government in Cairo moderated its position on Syria.

It is likely to continue to seek good business relations with Iraq. In the better years of Egyptian-Iraqi relations—particularly in the s—Iraq absorbed hundreds of thousands of Egyptian workers and was a source of cheap oil.

Egypt also has strong relations with the Iraqi Kurds. With no combat troops left in the country and little money left to expend on it, the United States has very limited influence over the new Iraq. The ambition that post-Saddam Baghdad would be a staunch American ally in the region or a pliant client has come to naught. Maliki has resisted U. This became apparent after the U. The number of personnel in the massive U.

From 16, in , there are expected to be no more than around 5, by the end of —and most of those are security and other contractors. Iraq no longer registers as a high priority in Washington. There is little strategic ambition in the relationship any more.

Nevertheless, the United States is still an important factor in Iraqi foreign relations. The two also have important economic and energy relations. They trade extensively, with Iraqi oil exported to the United States and a range of U. But Iraq also imports products from a wide range of other countries, East and West. Washington had been pushing a rapprochement between Ankara and Erbil for years, especially as U.

The drift of American oil companies north has also deepened U. The Kremlin spoke out against the invasion but took no major action to stand against it. Russia was just emerging under President Vladimir Putin from a decade of internal troubles and global retreat, and Putin still put much stock in the future of the relationship with the United States and then U.

Bush, with whom he had found areas of common concern over the war against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Islamist radicalism. But as Russian-U. It exhausted American hard power, sapped its soft power, and drove oil prices—and Russian energy revenues—sky high.

By the end of the decade, the United States was in strategic retreat, Baghdad emerged as decidedly not a U. In July , Maliki visited Moscow reportedly to convince Russian companies to replace ExxonMobil, which is looking to reduce its stake in the West Qurna field. Indeed, Russia is rebuilding its profile as a strategic player in the Middle East, and relations between Baghdad and Moscow might be part of that trajectory. Maliki is eager to counterbalance American weapons purchases and oil contracts with Russian ones.

Between the two U. Gulf Wars of and , Russia was notable for its strategic absence; in the Syrian uprising, however, Russia has taken a major stand. When the Syrian uprising escalated and debate began as to whether the international community should intervene against Assad, Russia took a firm position against any intervention. Moreover, Russia moved to provide open political and military support to the embattled Assad regime. As the region polarized, Russia ended up being the international patron of the regional alliance backing Assad, which includes Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus, and Hezbollah.

Whether, within this context, relations between Baghdad and Moscow will deepen further is yet to be seen. If the Iraq War was at least partially fought for oil, then the winner would have to be declared China.

Beijing currently imports about thousand barrels of Iraqi crude per day, but that figure could climb to around 2 million over the next two decades. In the long term, energy and defense cooperation could help define new strategic balances in the region. For now, the relationship is all business. Europe was divided over the U. The UK, Spain, and Italy participated with troops and some postwar aid, but the EU as a body remained initially disengaged.

Eager to find a political process it could endorse, the EU provided funding for the first postwar elections in and has maintained steady funding and technical support for subsequent referenda and elections. As the Iraqi economy picked up, trade between Baghdad and the EU countries increased.

In , after years of negotiations, they signed a more comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that provides a framework for cooperation in many areas, including trade and investment, health and education, energy, environment, and the fields of justice and security. Iraq and the EU have become important trading partners: Europe is the second-biggest exporter to Iraq, after the United States, and Iraq has become the tenth-largest provider of energy for Europe.

European countries have an interest in stability and further growth in Iraq and share a concern for the continued internal tensions in the country and the potential impact of the Syria crisis. The country needs to maintain working relations with a wide array of states and economies in the region and the world, but its factions will continue to jockey for internal advantage and seek favor among regional rivals.

Iraqi foreign policy is unlikely to be unified anytime soon. Major decisions will be made by the prime minister in Baghdad, but Erbil will continue to set its own course as much as it can, and Sunni parties will continue to be empowered by events in Syria to pursue their own foreign relations.

Leaders in Baghdad and Erbil have a preference for pursuing external relations that build their economy and benefit them at the same time, and they appear to have little interest in, or appetite for, becoming full players in rigid regional or international axes that might bring new waves of confrontation and warfare.

Iraq faces a difficult path if it hopes to become an influential player in the region or internationally. The Syrian crisis has polarized the region and pushed Baghdad into a position of virtual hostility with much of the Arab world. Nevertheless, the country is already casting a significant economic shadow. The interests and relations built into this economic growth should be important factors in pushing for regional accommodation and avoiding costly confrontation.

And perhaps more significantly, Iraq will become an increasingly important player in global oil markets. Despite its internal dysfunctions, Iraq will be a producer to pay attention to in the global economy of this century. Iraq has already been impacted by the war in Syria both internally, in terms of heightened tensions with the Kurdish and Sunni communities and the resurgence of al-Qaeda, and externally, in terms of trying to accommodate contradictory external pressures and considerations.

If the Assad regime holds on in Syria and that country enters a long period of internal division without any side winning outright—a situation not dissimilar to the balance between Baghdad and Erbil—Iraq could probably coexist with that reality although with recurring internal crises. But Iraq has much to gain from a negotiated resolution to the war in Syria—through Geneva II or any other mechanism—and in regional and international cooperation in combating al-Qaeda.

Any reduction in regional polarization would also tamp down internal tensions in Iraq by reducing the impetus for various powers in the Middle East to back rival Iraqi factions. And improved Iran-GCC relations would increase the chances for better political and economic relations between Iraq and the Gulf monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia, which refuses to deal with Baghdad as long as it perceives Maliki as part of a hostile Iranian axis.

In addition, Iraq would benefit from increased trade and economic opportunity if the Iranian economy were to rebound. But if the talks were to lead to a dead end and international tensions with Iran were to escalate once again, Iraq would be at renewed risk.

Iraq might not be able to survive such an attack. In the meantime, the leaders in Baghdad have their hands full managing internal political differences, facing down a renewed al-Qaeda threat, reintegrating Iraq into the region and the world, building profitable—both for them and, in some cases, for the public interest—foreign economic relations, and trying to avoid especially disruptive internal or external conflict.

The challenge of overcoming internal differences and building national stability and cooperation will remain a principal one; and the challenge of preventing external regional differences from fomenting internal wars or major regional confrontations will also be important. In some cases, the best that can be hoped for is to muddle through without conditions becoming considerably worse. As it is, Iraq has made tremendous progress since This is especially important in a region where all players have taken combative sides—especially over Syria—and in which previously pragmatic and centrist countries, like Turkey, for example, have also abandoned the middle.

In the coming years, and despite recent polarization both internally and externally, Iraq will continue to have strong relationships internationally with the United States and the West in general, as well as with Russia, China, and India. Regionally, it will remain close to Iran, but it would prefer to also be able to reconstruct the web of relations it was building before the war in Syria—which included good relations with Iran, Turkey, Syria, and some members of the GCC—than to have to pick sides.

Whether its own leaders—or the leaders of regional or international powers—will be able to move forward in that direction is a challenge that the following months and years will reveal. Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author s and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

Downtown Beirut, P. Box Riad El Solh, Lebanon. In an increasingly crowded, chaotic, and contested world and marketplace of ideas, the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center offers decisionmakers global, independent, and strategic insight and innovative ideas that advance international peace. By using this website, you agree to our cookie policy.

Carnegie Middle East Center. Issues Projects Regions Blogs. December 24, Paper. Until Baghdad resolves the issues polarizing the country, Iraqi foreign policy will remain disjointed and incoherent. Print Page. Contracts with Western, Chinese, and Russian energy companies have revitalized its oil sector, and Baghdad has built relations with Iran, Turkey, several Gulf countries, Jordan, and Syria to help meet its energy-transport, water, and electricity needs.

Baghdad has moderately supported the Syrian regime while Erbil and Iraqi Sunnis have sided with the rebels in the ongoing civil war. Until Iraq resolves domestic disagreements over energy, internal borders, and power sharing, Erbil and the Sunnis will continue advancing their own international agendas and Iraq will lack a coherent foreign policy. He works and publishes on the regional and international relations of the Middle East as well as issues of political development and democratization in the Arab world.

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